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ABSTRACT
In an effort to improve the quality of schools, governments around the world have dramatically
increased the resources devoted to them.  By concentrating on inputs and ignoring the incentives within
schools, the resources have yielded little in the way of general improvement in student achievement.  This
paper provides a review of the United States and international evidence on the effectiveness of such input
policies.  It then contrasts the impact of resources with that of variations in teacher quality that are not
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  Academic and policy interest in improving schools has followed directly from recognition of the 
importance of human capital formation to both individuals and society.  Much of the motivation comes 
from theoretical and empirical analyses of the relationship between income, productivity, and economic 
growth and the quantity of schooling of individuals – the most common proxy for human capital levels.  
For the most part, however, policy initiatives do not focus on the quantity of schooling but instead on 
the quality of schooling.  And, it is here that controversy about research into the determinants of quality 
has led to ambiguities about policy.  This discussion reviews basic evidence on student performance and 
puts it into the context of contemporary policy debates.  The central conclusion is that the commonly 
used input policies – such as lowering class sizes or tightening the requirements for teaching credentials 
– are almost certainly inferior to altered incentives within the schools. 
  The general arguments about schooling in the United States and elsewhere in the world have a 
simple structure.  First, the high returns to additional schooling are noted.  In the U.S. these returns 
have grown dramatically over the past twenty years, particularly for a college education.  During the 
1990s, for example, an average college graduate earned in excess of a 70 percent premium above the 
average high school graduate (e.g., Pierce and Welch (1996)).  Schooling returns in other countries, 
while varying, have also been high (Psacharopoulos (1989, 1994); Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (2001)).  Second, having noted the individual returns to schooling, the 
policy discussion quickly shifts to the necessity to invest further in human capital, which is translated 
directly into an argument for providing more public funding for schools.  While again there is some 
variation depending on each country’s school attainment rates, the arguments for increased funding 
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generally do not revolve around supporting more years of schooling for individuals but instead 
concentrate on improving the quality of the existing years of schooling.  Embedded in this shift are a 
number of presumptions that are widely held.  One is that quality has the same payoffs as quantity of 
schooling.  Another is that greater funding will lead to improved quality.  This paper considers the 
latter presumption – that spending and quality are closely related – in detail. 
Before entering into the central discussion, however, it is useful to establish some facts about 
the value of “quality.”  There is mounting evidence that quality – generally measured by test scores – is 
related to individual earnings,
1 productivity, and economic growth. While focusing on the estimated 
returns to years of schooling, early studies of wage determination tended to indicate relatively modest 
impacts of variations in cognitive ability after holding constant quantity of schooling.  More recent 
direct investigations of cognitive achievement, however, have suggested generally larger labor market 
returns to measured individual differences in cognitive achievement.  For example, Bishop (1989, 
1992), O'Neill (1990), Grogger and Eide (1993), Blackburn and Neumark (1993, 1995), Murnane, 
Willett, and Levy (1995), Neal and Johnson (1996), Murnane et al. (2000), and Murnane et al. (2001) 
each find that the earnings advantages to higher achievement on standardized tests are quite substantial.
2  
                                                  
1 While human capital has been central to much of labour economics for some four decades, its measurement has 
been more problematic.  The most commonly employed measure is simply the years of school completed, but this 
measure neglects any quality differences arising from both school and nonschool differences across individuals.  
The most commonly employed measure of quality involves cognitive test scores, although the adequacy of this 
measure has not been fully investigated (see, for example, Murnane et al. (2001)).  Early analyses of earnings 
employing test scores generally treated them as fixed measures of ability difference (e.g., Griliches (1974)).  
Considerable evidence, however, including some presented below that the typical cognitive tests are very much 
dependent on both families and schools. 
2These results are derived from quite different approaches.  Bishop (1989) considers the measurement errors 
inherent in most testing situation and demonstrates that careful treatment of that problem has a dramatic effect on 
the estimated importance of test differences.  O'Neill (1990), Grogger and Eide (1993), Bishop (1991), and Neal 
and Johnson (1996) on the other hand simply rely upon more recent labor market data along with more 
representative sampling and suggest that the earnings advantage to measured skill differences is larger than that 
found in earlier time periods and in earlier studies (even without correcting for test reliability).  Murnane, Willett, 
and Levy (1995) considering a comparison over time, demonstrate that the results of increased returns to 
measured skills hold regardless across simple analysis and error-corrected estimation.  Murnane et al. (2000) and 
Murnane et al. (2001) employ representative samples but introduce other measures of individual skill.  Blackburn 
and Neumark (1993, 1995), like much of the early literature, concentrate mainly on any bias in the estimated rates 
of return to schooling when ability measures are omitted. 3 
 
 
    
International evidence is less plentiful but also demonstrates a labor market return to cognitive skills 
(Currie and Thomas (2000), Boissiere, Knight, and Sabot (1985)).  The difficulty of separating 
cognitive skills from pure schooling has nonetheless made this estimation very difficult (Cawley et al. 
(2000; Heckman and Vytlacil (2001)) and thus leaves ambiguity about the exact magnitude of effects. 
Similarly, society appears to gain in terms of productivity.  Hanushek and Kimko (2000) 
demonstrate that quality differences in schools have a dramatic impact on productivity and national 
growth rates.  This study of growth rates incorporates information on international math and science 
examinations into standard cross-country growth regressions.  It finds a very strong relationship 
between test performance and national growth and a smaller relationship between quantity of schooling 
and growth. A series of investigations of the structure suggests a causal relationship. 
An additional part of the return to school quality comes through continuation in school.  There 
is substantial United States evidence that students who do better in school, either through grades or 
scores on standardized achievement tests, tend to go farther in school (see, for example, Dugan (1976); 
Manski and Wise (1983)).  Rivkin (1995) finds that variations in test scores capture a considerable 
proportion of the systematic variation in high school completion and in college continuation, so that test 
score differences can fully explain black-white differences in schooling.  Bishop (1991) and Hanushek, 
Rivkin, and Taylor (1996) find that individual achievement scores are highly correlated with school 
attendance.  Behrman et al. (1998) find strong achievement effects on both continuation into college and 
quality of college; moreover, the effects are larger when proper account is taken of the endogeneity of 
achievement.  Hanushek and Pace (1995), using the High School and Beyond data, find that college 
completion is significantly related to higher test scores at the end of high school. 
  Quality is nonetheless virtually impossible to dictate through policy.  The quest for improved 
quality has undoubtedly contributed to recent expansions in the resources devoted to schools in the U.S. 
and other countries.  Eager to improve quality and unable to do it directly, government policy typically 
moves to what is thought to be the next best thing – providing added resources to schools.  Broad 4 
 
 
    
evidence from the experience in the United States and the rest of the world suggests that this is an 
ineffective way to improve quality. 
  This Forum both points to interest in the topic and highlights some of the interpretive issues that 
arise.  The discussion of school policy frequently involves an intensity not common to many other 
academic debates, because the results of analyses of schools at times have direct influence on policy.  
Thus, for example, the arguments for reduced class size in Krueger (2000), reproduced in this Forum 
as Krueger (2002), have already provided fuel for advocates of lowering class sizes.
3  And the 
Dustmann, Rajah, and van Soest (2002) article will similarly find a waiting policy audience as teacher 
employment policies are debated around the globe.  What makes the issues more complicated is the 
difficulty of interpreting results, based as they are on imperfect data and incomplete description of the 
underlying structure (Todd and Wolpin (2002)).   
Because class size policies are currently being broadly discussed, attention to other significant 
dimensions of input policy decisions tends to be neglected.  The following article presents the available 
evidence on a broad set of resource policies in schools.  While some of the evidence is less reliable than 
others, the overall picture is remarkably consistent.  Even discounting significant portions of the 
available evidence, one is left with the clear picture that input policies of the type typically pursued 
have little chance of being effective. 
1.  School inputs and outcomes  
  Much of the policy discussion throughout the world concentrates on schooling inputs, a 
seemingly natural focus.  And, with the longstanding importance that has been attached to schooling, 
considerable change has occurred in the levels of common inputs.  Class sizes have fallen, 
qualifications of teachers have risen, and expenditures have increased.  Unfortunately, little evidence 
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exists to suggest that any significant changes in student outcomes have accompanied this growth in 
resources devoted to schools.  Because many find the limited relationship between school inputs and 
student outcomes surprising and hard to believe, this section delves into the evidence available on this 
score in some detail.   
  These data on aggregate cost and performance provide strong prima facie evidence that simple 
resource policies are not generally effective.  Much of the current policy discussion argues that with 
additional resources it would be possible to implement programs or approaches that lift student 
achievement.  Of course, these are precisely the same arguments made over the past decades.  The 
validity of current proposals rests on these current proposals being notably superior to the policies of 
the past (which were hypothesized at the time also to be superior policies). 
1.1  Aggregate United States data  
  The simplest and perhaps clearest demonstration of the resource story is found in the aggregate 
United States data over the past few decades.  The United States, operating under a system that is 
largely decentralized to the fifty separate states, has pursued the conventionally advocated resource 
policies vigorously.  Table 1 tracks the patterns of pupil-teacher ratios, teacher education, and teacher 
experience.  Between 1960 and 2000, pupil-teacher ratios fell by almost 40 percent. The proportion of 
teachers with a master’s degree or more over doubled so that a majority of all U.S. teachers today have 
at least a master’s degree.  Finally, median teacher experience – which is more driven by demographic 
cycles than active policy – increased significantly, almost doubling since its trough in 1970. 
  American teachers are heavily unionized, and the most common structure of teacher contracts 
identifies teacher education levels and teacher experience as the driving force behind salaries.  Thus, as 
teacher inputs rise and as the numbers of students per teachers decline, expenditure per pupil rises.  As 
seen in the bottom row of Table 1, real expenditures per pupil more than tripled over this period.
4  In 
                                                  
4The calculation of real expenditures deflates by the Consumer Price Index.  If the alternative of a wage deflator 
were employed, the calculated rate of real increase over this period would not change much. Baumol’s disease  
 
 
    
 Table 1.  Public School Resources in the United States, 1960-2000 
 
  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000 
Pupil-teacher ratio  25.8  22.3  18.7  17.2  16.0 
% teachers with master's 
degree or more 
23.5  27.5  49.6  53.1  56.2
a 
median years teacher 
experience 




$2,235  $3,782  $5,124  $6,867  $7,591 
 
Note:  a.  Data pertain to 1995.  The statistical data of the National Education Association on characteristics of 
teachers was discontinued. 
 





    
fact, this period is not special in U.S. schools.  Over the entire 100 years of 1890-1990, real spending 
per pupil rose by at a remarkably steady pace of 3½ percent per year (Hanushek and Rivkin (1997)).  
Over this longer period, real per student expenditure in 1990 dollars goes from $164 in 1890 to $772 in 
1940 to $4,622 in 1990—roughly quintupling in each fifty year period.
5  
The question remains, what was obtained for these spending increases?  Since the early 1970s, 
a random sample of students in the U.S. has been given tests at differing ages in various subjects under 
the auspices of the National Assessment of Educational Progress, or NAEP.  These tests have been 
designed to provide a consistent measure of performance over time.  Fig. 1 gives performance data for 
the same period as the previously described input data.  In this figure the pattern of average 
performance by 17-year-olds is traced for reading, mathematics, and science.  The performance of 
students in math and reading is ever so slightly higher in 1999 than thirty years before when spending 
was dramatically lower.
6  The performance of students in science is significantly lower in 1999 than it 
was in 1970.  Writing performance (not shown) was first tested in 1984 and declined steadily until 1996 
when testing was discontinued. 
  The only other test that provides a national picture of performance over a long period of time is 
the Scholastic Aptitude Test, or SAT.  This college admissions test has the advantage of providing data 
going back to the 1960s but the disadvantage of being a voluntary test taken by a selective subset of the 
population.
7  Scores on this test actually plunged from the mid1960s until the end of the 1970s, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(Baumol (1967)) is frequently cited at this point to explain increases in input costs without increasing real inputs.  
Specifically, if service sectors are ones where productivity growth is necessarily low – say, for technological 
reasons – they will face cost pressures in the hiring of inputs, putting the service sector (technologically 
backward) at a disadvantage.  Over this period, however, such pressures cannot explain the patterns of inputs and 
outputs to schooling (Hanushek (1997b)). 
5 These calculations differ from those in Table 1 both in using a different deflator (GDP deflator in 1990 dollars) 
and in calculating spending per pupil on a membership rather than an attendance basis. 
6 The cumulative nature of the educational process implies that scores will reflect both current and past spending.  
A 17-year-old in 1970, for example, would have entered school in the late 1950s, implying that the resource 
growth in Table 1 that goes back to 1960 is relevant for comparison with the NAEP performance data. 
7 NAEP samples are not tainted by selection.  The school completion rate and the rate of attendance of private  
 
 
    
      























    
suggesting that the NAEP scores that begin in the 1970s may understate the magnitude of the 
performance problem.
8  
  In simplest terms, input policies have been vigorously pursued over a long period of time, but 
there is no evidence that the added resources have improved student performance, at least for the most 
recent three decades when it has been possible to compare qualitative outcomes.  This evidence 
suggests that the efficacy of further input-based policies depends crucially on improved use of resources 
compared to past history. 
  Two arguments are made, however, for why the simple comparison of expenditures and student 
performance might be misleading: 1.  The characteristics of students may have changed such that they 
are more difficult (and expensive) to educate now than in the past: and, 2.  Other expansions of the 
requirements on schools have driven up costs but would not be expected to influence observed student 
performance. 
1.1.1.  Changes in students.  One simple explanation for why added resources yield no apparent 
performance improvement is that students are more poorly prepared or motivated for school over time 
over time, requiring added resources just to stay even.  For example, there have been clear increases in 
the proportion of children living in single-parent families and, relatedly, in child poverty rates–both of 
which are hypothesized to lead to lower student achievement.  Between 1970 and 1990, children living 
in poverty families rose from 14.9 to 19.9 percent, while children living with both parents declined 
from 85 to 73 percent. But, there have also been other trends that appear to be positive forces on 
student achievement.  Family sizes have fallen, and parental education levels have improved.  Over the 
same period, adults aged 25-29 with a high school or greater level of schooling went from 74 to 86 
                                                                                                                                                                  
schools have been essentially constant over the period of the NAEP tests and testing involves a random sample of 
public school children. 
8Analyses of the changes in SAT scores suggest that a portion of the decline in scores comes from increases in the 
rate of test taking but that the decline also has a real component of lesser average performance over time (Wirtz 
(1977); Congressional Budget Office (1986)). 8 
 
 
    
percent (up from 61 percent in 1960).  Moreover, among all families with children, the percentage with 
three or more children fell from 36 to 20 percent. 
  It is difficult to know how to net out these opposing trends with any accuracy.  Extensive 
research, beginning with the Coleman Report (Coleman et al. (1966)) and continuing through today 
(Hanushek (1997a)), has demonstrated that differences in families are very important for student 
achievement.  Most of these studies have not focused their primary attention on families, however, and 
thus have not delved very far into the measurement and structure of any family influences.  Grissmer et 
al. (1994) attempts to sort out the various factors in a crude way.  That analysis uses econometric 
techniques to estimate how various family factors influence children’s achievement at a point in time.  
It then applies these cross-sectionally estimated regression coefficients as weights to the trended family 
background factors identified above.  Their overall findings are that black students performed better 
over time than would be expected from the trends in black family factors.  They attribute this better 
performance to improvements in schools.  On the other hand, white students, who make up the vast 
majority, performed worse over time than would expected, leading presumably to the opposite 
conclusion that schools for the majority of students actually got worse over time.   
  While there are reasons to be skeptical about these precise results, they do suggest that the 
spending-performance relationship is not driven in any simple way by changes in student preparation.
9   
Changes in family inputs have occurred over time, making it possible that a portion of the increased 
                                                  
9Skepticism about the results from Grissmer et al. (1994) comes from methodological problems.  First, they do 
not observe or measure differences in schools but instead simply attribute unexplained residual differences in the 
predicted and observed trends to school factors.  In reality any factor that affects achievement, that is 
unmeasured, and that has changed over their analysis period would be mixed with any school effects.  Second, in 
estimating the cross-sectional models that provide the weights for the trending family factors, no direct measures 
of school inputs are included.  In the standard analysis of misspecified econometric models, this omission will 
lead to biased estimates of the influence of family factors if school factors are correlated with the included family 
factors in the cross-sectional data that underlie their estimation.  For example, better educated parents might 
systematically tend to place their children in better schools.  In this simple example, a portion of the effects of 
schools will be incorrectly attributed to the education of parents, and this will lead to inappropriate weights for the 
trended family inputs. Third, one must believe either that the factors identified are the true causal influences or 
that they are stable proxies of the true factors, but there is doubt about this (cf. Mayer 1997).  9 
 
 
    
school resources has gone to offset adverse factors.  The evidence is nonetheless quite inconclusive 
about even the direction of any trend effects, let alone the magnitude.  The only available quantitative 
estimates indicate that changing family effects are unable to offset the large observed changes in pupil-
teacher ratios and school resources and may have even worked in the opposite direction, making the 
performance of schools appear better than it was.   
 
2.  Exogenous cost increases.   The most discussed cost concern involves “special education,” 
programs to deal with students who have various disabilities.  The issue is that these programs are 
expensive but the recipients tend not to take standardized tests.  Thus, even if special education 
programs are effective (Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (forthcoming)), the increased expenditures on 
special education will not show up in measured student performance.   
Concerns about the education of children with both physical and mental disabilities were 
translated into federal law with the enactment of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 
1975.  This Act prescribed a series of diagnostics, counseling activities, and services to be provided for 
handicapped students.  To implement this and subsequent laws and regulations school systems expanded 
staff and programs, developing entirely new administrative structures in many cases to handle “special 
education.”  The general thrust of the educational services has been to provide regular classroom 
instruction where possible ("mainstreaming") along with specialized instruction to deal with specific 
needs.  The result has been growth of students classified as the special education population even as the 
total student population fell.  Between 1977 and 1999, the percentage of students classified as disabled 
increases from 9.3 to 13.0 percent.  Moreover, the number of special education teachers increases 
much more rapidly than the number of children classified as disabled.  
  The magnitude of special education and its growth, however, are insufficient to reconcile the 
cost and performance dilemma.  Using the best available estimate of the cost differential for special 
education -- 2.3 times the cost of regular education (Chaikind, Danielson, and Brauen (1993)), the 10 
 
 
    
growth in special education students between 1980 and 1990 can explain less than 20 percent of the 
expenditure growth (Hanushek and Rivkin (1997)).  In other words, while special education programs 
have undoubtedly influenced overall expenditures, they remain a relatively small portion of the total 
spending on schools. 
  Direct estimates of other exogenous programs and changes resulting from other academic 
aspects of schools such as language instruction for immigrants or nonacademic programs such as sports, 
art, or music are not readily available.  Nonetheless, no evidence suggests that these can explain the 
magnitude of spending growth. 
1.2  Aggregate International data 
Most other countries of the world have not tracked student performance over any length of 
time, making analyses comparable to the United States discussion impossible.  Nonetheless, 
international testing over the past four decades permits an overview of spending across countries.  
Seven different mathematics and science tests have been given since the early 1960s to students at 
different grade levels in a varying set of voluntarily participating nations.  (Only the United States and 
the United Kingdom have participated in all testing).  The test performance across time, updated from 
Hanushek and Kimko (2000), is summarized in Fig. 2.  On this figure the scores for each test have 
been aggregated across grade levels and subtests and the world average in each year is set to 50.
10  
While the tests were not designed to track performance over time and while they have been taken by 
varying countries, they can be equated using the patterns of U.S. test performance reported in Fig. 1.  
This alternative normalization does not affect the pattern because the pattern of performance of United 
States students is essentially the same on both national and international exams.   
                                                  
10 A description of the individual tests and the aggregation of scores is given in Hanushek and Kim (1995).  The 
figure drops off the first year of testing (1965) when there are questions about representativeness of the sampling.  
It also does on include the most recent testing (TIMSS-R in 1999).  
 
 
    




















































































































































Figure 2.  Performance on International Mathematics and Science Examinations 11 
 
 
    
Performance bears little relationship to the patterns of expenditure across the countries.   Table 
2 provides the distribution of 1998 primary and secondary school spending per pupil across a set of 
countries participating in the recent Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS).  
These countries are sorted by order of aggregate performance on TIMSS, and a quick glance at the 
table highlights the incongruity of spending and performance.
11  The simple correlation between 
secondary school spending and TIMSS score is an insignificant 0.06. 
International comparisons, of course, amplify the problems of possible contamination of the 
influence of factors other than schools that was considered previously in the case of the United States.  
As a preliminary attempt to deal with some of these issues, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) estimate 
models that relate spending, family backgrounds, and other characteristics of countries to student 
performance for the tests prior to 1995.
12  This estimation consistently indicates a statistically significant 
negative effect of added resources on performance after controlling for other influences. 
Gundlach, Wossmann, and Gmelin (2001) consider changes in scores of a set of developed 
nations between 1970 and 1995 and their relationship to spending changes.  They conclude that 
productivity of schools has fallen dramatically across these countries.  Woessman (2000, 2001) also 
performs a related analysis that relies on just the 1995 performance information from the Third 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS).  His analysis suggests that traditional resource 
measures bear little consistent relationship to differences in scores among the 39 nations participating in 
TIMSS for 13-year-olds. 
 
                                                  
11 Data from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001) provide a consistent set of 
spending figures converted to United States dollars on a purchasing power parity basis.  A total of 23 TIMSS 
countries have reported spending figures. 
12 The estimation includes average schooling of parents, population growth rates, school participation rates, and 
separate intercepts for each of the different tests.  Several measures of school resources including spending as a 
proportion of GNP, current expenditures per student, and class size in elementary and secondary schools were 
also included.  
 
 
    
Table 2.  Primary and Secondary School Spending per Pupil in 1998, Sorted by Overall TIMSS 










Korea   $2838  $3544 
Japan   5075  5890 
Belgium
a  3771  6104 
Netherlands   3795  5304 
Austria  6065  8163 
Australia   3981  5830 
Sweden   5579  5648 
Czech Republic   1645  3182 
Ireland   2745  3934 
Switzerland  6470  9348 
Hungary   2028  2140 
United States   6043  7764 
United Kingdom  3329  5230 
Germany   3531  6209 
Norway  5761  7343 
France   3752  6605 
Thailand   1048  1177 
Denmark   6713  7200 
Spain   3267  4274 
Greece  2368  3287 
Italy  5653  6458 
Portugal   3121  4636 
Israel   4135  5115 
 
Note:  a.  Flemish and French speaking Belgium combined into single average expenditure. 
 




    
1.3  Conclusions from Aggregate Data 
Analysis of aggregate performance data is subject to a variety of problems.  Any relationship 
between resources and student achievement – whether within a single country or across different 
countries – might be distorted by other influences on performance.  Nonetheless, the variations in 
resources are huge, suggesting that any effect should be apparent in even crude comparisons.  No 
significant effect of spending comes through in the aggregate, even when consideration of family 
background differences is introduced. 
2.  Econometric Evidence  
  The aggregate story is supported by an extensive body of direct evidence coming from detailed 
econometric analyses of student achievement.  This evidence has been motivated by a monumental 
governmental study of U.S. achievement that was conducted in the mid1960s.  The “Coleman Report” 
(Coleman et al. (1966)) presented evidence that was widely interpreted as saying that schools did not 
matter.  The most important factor in achievement was the family, followed by peers in school.  This 
study led to a great amount of research – research that has supported part of the Coleman study but, 
more importantly, has clarified the interpretation. 
2.1  United States Estimates 
  The statistical analyses relevant to this work have a common framework that has been well-
understood for some time (Hanushek (1979)).  Student achievement at a point in time is related to the 
primary inputs: family influences, peers, and schools.  The educational process is also cumulative, so 
that both historical and contemporaneous inputs influence current performance.   
  With the exception of the Coleman Report, the subsequent analysis seldom has relied on data 
collected specifically for the study of the educational process.  Instead, it has tended to be 
opportunistic, employing available data to gain insights into school operations.  The focus of much of 
this work has been the effect of varying resources on student achievement.  This focus flows from the 13 
 
 
    
underlying perspective of production functions; from its obvious relevance for policy; and from the 
prevalence of relevant resource data in the administrative records that are frequently used.   
   The summary of production in United States schools begins with all of the separate estimates of 
the effects of resources on student performance, and then concentrates on a more refined set of 
estimates.
13  The underlying work includes all published analyses prior to 1995 that include one of the 
resource measures described below, that have some measure of family inputs in addition to schools, and 
that provides the sign and statistical significance of the resource relationship with a measurable student 
outcome.  The 89 individual publications that appeared before 1995 and that form the basis for this 
analysis contain 376 separate production function estimates.  While a large number of analyses were 
produced as a more or less immediate reaction to the Coleman Report, half of the available estimates 
have been published since 1985.  Of course, a number of subsequent analyses have also appeared since 
1995.  While not formally assessed, it is clear that including them would not significantly change any of 
the results reported here, given their mixed results and the large number of prior estimates. 
  Understanding the character of the underlying analyses is important for the subsequent 
interpretation.  Three-quarters of the estimates rely on student performance measured by standardized 
tests, while the remainder uses a variety of different measures including such things as continuation in 
school, dropout behavior, and subsequent labor market earnings.  Not surprisingly, test score 
performance measures are more frequently employed for studying education in primary schools, while 
a vast majority of the analyses of other outcomes relate to secondary schools.  The level of aggregation 
                                                  
13Individual publications typically contain more than one set of estimates, distinguished by different measures of 
student performance, by different grade levels, and frequently by entirely different sampling designs.  If, 
however, a publication includes estimates of alternative specifications employing the same sample and 
performance measures, only one of the alternative estimates is included. As a general rule, the tabulated results 
reflect the estimates that are emphasized by the authors of the underlying papers.  In some cases, this rule did not 
lead to a clear choice, at which time the tabulation emphasized statistically significant results among the 
alternatives preferred by the original author.  An alternative approach, followed by Betts (1996), aggregates all of 
the separate estimates of a common parameter that are presented in each individual paper.  Still another approach, 
followed by Krueger (2000), aggregates all estimates in a given publication into a single estimate, regardless of 
the underlying parameter that is being estimated (see discussion below).   14 
 
 
    
of the school input measures is also an issue considered in detail below.  One-quarter of the estimates 
consider performance in individual classrooms, while 10 percent focus on school inputs only at the 
level of the state.  Moreover, fully one-quarter of the estimates employing nontest measures rely solely 
on interstate variations in school inputs. 
  Table 3 presents the overall summary of basic results about the key resources that form the 
basis for most overall policy discussions.
14  The standard hypothesis driving policy initiatives is that 
each of these resources should have a positive effect on student performance.
15  In terms of real 
classroom resources, only 9 percent of the estimates considering the level of teachers’ education and 14 
percent of the estimates investigating teacher-pupil ratios find positive and statistically significant effects 
on student performance.
16  These relatively small numbers of statistically significant positive results are 
balanced by another set finding statistically significant negative results—reaching 14 percent in the case 
of teacher-pupil ratios.
17  A higher proportion of estimated effects of teacher experience are positive and 
statistically significant: 29 percent.  Importantly, however, 71 percent still indicate either worsening 
performance with experience or less confidence in any positive effect.  And, because more experienced 
teachers can frequently choose their school and/or students, a portion of the positive effects could 
                                                  
14A more complete description of the studies can be found in Hanushek (1997a), which updates the analysis in 
Hanushek (1986).  The tabulations here correct some of the original miscoding of effects in that publication.  
They also omit the estimates from Card and Krueger (1992b).  In reviewing all of the studies and estimates, it was 
discovered that these estimates were based on models that did not include any measures of family background 
differences.  As a minimal quality criterion, tabulated estimates must come from statistical models that include 
some measure of family background, since omission will almost certainly lead to biased resource estimates.  
Family backgrounds have been shown to be quite generally correlated with school resources and have been shown 
to have strong effects on student outcomes. 
15 It is possible that the level and shape of the salary schedule with respect to experience are set to attract and 
retain an optimal supply of teachers and that the year-to-year changes in salaries do not reflect short run 
productivity differences.  This possibility would introduce some ambiguity about expectations of estimates of 
experience and salary effects. 
16The individual studies tend to measure each of these inputs in different ways.  With teacher-pupil ratio, for 
example, some measure actual class size, while the majority measure teacher-pupil ratio. In all cases, estimated 
signs are reversed if the measure involves pupil-teacher ratios or class size instead of teacher-pupil ratio.  
17 While a large portion of the studies merely note that the estimated coefficient is statistically insignificant without 
giving the direction of the estimated effect, those statistically insignificant studies reporting the sign of estimated 
coefficients are split fairly evenly between positive and negative.    
 
 
    
        
 
  
Table 3.  Percentage Distribution of Estimated Effect of Key 





Resources  number of 
estimates 
Statistically significant    
   Positive  Negative   
Statistically 
insignificant 
Real classroom resources         
Teacher-pupil ratio  276  14%  14%    72% 
Teacher education  170   9  5    86 
Teacher experience  206  29  5    66 
Financial aggregates        
Teacher salary  118  20%  7%    73% 
Expenditure per pupil 
 
163 27  7    66 
Other         
Facilities 91  9  5    86 
Administration 75  12  5    83 
Teacher test scores  41  37  10    53 
 






    
actually reflect reverse causation (Greenberg and McCall (1974); Murnane (1981); Hanushek, Kain, 
and Rivkin (2001b)).  In sum, the vast number of estimated real resource effects gives little confidence 
that just adding more of any of the specific resources to schools will lead to a boost in student 
achievement.  Moreover, this statement does not even get into whether or not any effects are ‘large’.  
Given the small confidence in just getting noticeable improvements, it seems somewhat unimportant to 
investigate the size of any estimated effects. 
  The financial aggregates provide a similar picture.  There is very weak support for the notion 
that simply providing higher teacher salaries or greater overall spending will lead to improved student 
performance.  Per pupil expenditure has received the most attention, but only 27 percent of the 
estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant.  In fact, seven percent even suggest some 
confidence in the fact that spending more would harm student achievement.  In reality, as discussed 
below, analyses involving per pupil expenditure tend to be the lowest quality, and there is substantial 
reason to believe that even these results overstate the true effect of added expenditure. 
2.1.1.  Study Quality  
  The tabulated analyses of educational performance clearly differ in quality and their potential 
for yielding biased results.  Two elements of quality, both related to model specification and estimation, 
are particularly important.  First, education policy in the United States is made chiefly by the separate 
50 states, and the resulting variations in spending, regulations, graduation requirements, testing, labor 
laws, and teacher certification and hiring policies are large.  These important differences – which are 
also the locus of most current policy debates – imply that any estimates of student performance across 
states must include descriptions of the policy environment of schools or else they will be subject to 
standard omitted variables bias.  The misspecification bias of models that ignore variations in state 
education policy (and other potential state differences) will be exacerbated by aggregation of the 
estimation sample.  Second, as noted, education is a cumulative process, but a majority of analyses are 
purely cross-sectional with only contemporaneous measures of inputs.  In other words, when looking at 16 
 
 
    
performance at the end of secondary schooling, many analyses include just measures of the current 
teachers and school resources and ignore the dozen or more prior years of inputs.  Obviously, current 
school inputs will tend to be a very imperfect measure of the resources that went into producing ending 
achievement.  This mismeasurement is strongest for any children who changed schools over their career 
(a sizable majority in the United States) but also holds for students who do not move because of the 
heterogeneity of teachers within individual schools (see Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2001a); Rivkin, 
Hanushek, and Kain (2001)).  Even if contemporaneous measures were reasonable proxies for the 
stream of cumulative inputs, uncertainty about the interpretation and policy implications would remain.  
But there is little reason to believe that they are good proxies.   
  While judgments about study quality have a subjective element, it is possible to make 
straightforward distinctions based on violations of these two problems.  We begin with the issue of 
measuring the policy environment.  States differ dramatically in their policies, and ignoring any policies 
that have a direct impact will bias the statistical results if important policies tend to be correlated with 
the resource usage across states.  While the direction of any bias depends on the magnitude and sign of 
correlation, under quite general circumstances, the severity will increase with the level of aggregation 
of the school inputs.  That is, any bias will tend to be more severe if estimation is conducted at the state 
level than if conducted at the classroom level (Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor (1996)).
18   
Table 4 provides insight into the pattern and importance of the specific omitted variables bias 
resulting from lack of information about key educational policy differences.  This table considers two 
input measures: teacher-pupil ratio and expenditure per pupil.  These inputs, on top of being important 
for policy, are included in a sufficient number of analyses at various levels of aggregation that they can 
point to the potential misspecification biases.  As discussed previously, the overall percentage of all 
                                                  
18 The discussion of aggregation is part of a broader debate trying to reconcile the findings of Card and Krueger 
(1992a) with those presented here.  For a fuller discussion, see Burtless (1996). Of particular relevance is 
Heckman, Layne-Farrar, and Todd (1996a, 1996b), which raises other issues with the Card and Krueger 
estimation.  Specifically, their key identifying assumption of no selective migration is violated.  Similarly,  
 
 
    
Table 4.  Percentage Distribution of Estimated Effect of Teacher-




Level of aggregation of recources  number of 
estimates 
Statistically significant     Statistically 
insignificant 
 
   Positive  Negative     
A.  Teacher-Pupil Ratio 
Total   276  14%  14%    72% 
Single state samples
a 157  11  18    71 
Multiple state samples
b 119  18  8    74 
   Disaggregated within states
c 109  14  8    78 
   State level aggregation
d     10  60  0    40 
B.  Expenditure per pupil 
Total   163  27%  7%    66% 
Single state samples
a  89 20 11    69 
Multiple state samples
b 74  35  1    64 
   Disaggregated within states
c 46  17  0    83 
   State level aggregation
d    
 




a.  Estimates from samples drawn within single states. 
b.  Estimates from samples drawn across multiple states. 
c.  Resource measures at level of classroom, school, district, or county, allowing for variation within each state.  
d.  Resource measures aggregated to state level with no variation within each state. 17 
 
 
    
estimates of teacher-pupil ratios that are statistically significant and positive is evenly balanced by those 
that are statistically significant and negative.  But this is not true for estimates relying upon samples 
drawn entirely within a single state, where the overall policy environment is constant and thus where 
any bias from omitting overall state policies is minimized or eliminated.  For single state estimates, the 
statistically significant effects are disproportionately negative.  Yet, as the samples are drawn across 
states, the relative proportion positive and statistically significant rises.  For those aggregated to the 
state level, almost two-thirds of the estimates are positive and statistically significant.  The pattern of 
results also holds for estimates of the effects of expenditure differences (which are more likely to come 
from highly aggregate analyses involving multiple states).
19   
This pattern of results is consistent with expectations from considering specification biases 
when favorable state policies tend to be positively correlated with resource usage.  The initial 
assessment of effects indicated little reason to be confident about overall resource policies.  This 
refinement on quality indicates that a number of the significant effects may further be artifacts of the 
sampling and methodology. 
The second problem is a different variant of model specification.  Because education is a 
cumulative process, relating the level of performance at any point in time just to the current resources is 
likely to be misleading.  The standard approach for dealing with this is the estimation of value-added 
models where attention is restricted to the growth of achievement over a limited period of time (where 
the flow of resources is also observed).  By concentrating on achievement gains over, say, a single 
                                                                                                                                                                  
assumptions about homogeneity of effects across schooling categories are found not to hold. 
19 Expenditure studies virtually never direct analysis at performance across different classrooms or schools, since 
expenditure data are typically available only at the district level.  Thus, they begin at a more aggregated level than 
many studies of real resources. 
An alternative explanation of the stronger estimates with aggregation is that the disaggregated studies are subject 
to considerable errors-in-measurement of the resource variables.  The analysis in Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor 
(1996), however, suggests that measurement error is not the driving force behind the pattern of results. 18 
 
 
    
grade, it is possible to control for initial achievement differences, which will be determined by earlier 
resources and other educational inputs. In other words, fixed but unmeasured factors are eliminated. 
Table 5 displays the results of estimates that consider value-added models for individual 
students.  The top panel shows all such results, while the bottom panel follows the earlier approach of 
concentrating just on estimates within an individual state.  With the most refined investigation of 
quality, the number of analyses gets quite small and selective.  In these, however, there is no support 
for systematic improvements through increasing teacher-pupil ratios and hiring teachers with more 
graduate education.  The effects of teacher experience are largely unaffected from those for the 
universe of estimates.  The highest quality estimates indicate that the prior overall results were not 
simply an artifact of study quality.  If anything, the total set of estimates understates the ineffectiveness 
of pure resources differences in affecting student outcomes. 
  Krueger (2000), reproduced in this Forum, takes a different approach is tabulating the results – 
recording a single composite estimate for each publication.
20  He implies that he is making overall 
quality judgments in his tabulations when he selectively contrasts a few publications with both a large 
number of estimates and potentially damaging statistical problems with an analysis that has both a small 
number of estimates and better statistical modeling (Summers and Wolfe (1977)).  This impression is, 
however, very deceptive, and the mechanical tabulation approaches do not provide such any effective 
overall quality assessment.
21 
  A review of the available estimates clarifies how Krueger’s tabulation of teacher-pupil ratio 
results differs:  17 of the 59 publications (29%) contained a single estimate of the effect of the teacher-
                                                  
20 A separate approach to aggregating the econometric results, referred to as “meta-analysis,” has been proposed 
by Greenwald, Hedges, and Laine (1996).  Instead of just tabulating results, they propose formal statistical 
analysis.  This approach, however, typically considers the wrong hypothesis for policy discussions (i.e., that all 
estimated coefficients for a given parameter are simultaneously zero).  Further, these approaches invariably lack 
the necessary statistical information when they rely on just published results.  See Hanushek (1996). 
21 A central motivation for Krueger (2000) is that publications containing more estimates will have smaller sample 
sizes and thus will typically have larger standard errors.  Sample sizes do not, however, fall on average with the 
number of estimates (Hanushek (2000)).    
 
 
    
Table 5.  Percentage Distribution of Other Estimated Influences on 
Student Performance, Based on Value-added Models of Individual 
Student Performance 
      
 
Resources  number of 
estimates 
Statistically significant     Statistically 
insignificant 
   Positive  Negative    
A.  All estimates         
Teacher-pupil ratio   78  12%  8%    80% 
Teacher education  40  0  10    90 
Teacher experience  61  36  2    62 
b.  Estimates within a single state 
Teacher-pupil ratio   23  4%  13%    83% 
Teacher education  33  0  9    91 





    
pupil ratio — but these estimates are only 6% of the 277 total available estimates.
22 Krueger wants to 
increase the weight on these 17 estimates (publications) and commensurately decrease the weight on the 
remaining 260 estimates. Note, however, that over 40% of the single-estimate publications use state 
aggregate data, compared to only 4% of all estimates.  Relatedly, the single-estimate publications are 
more likely to employ multistate estimates (which consistently ignore any systematic differences in state 
policies) than the publications with two or more estimates. Weighting by publications rather than 
separate estimates, as Krueger promotes, heavily weights low-quality estimates that suffer from the two 
major quality problems discussed above. 
  The explicit quality considerations made in the bottom panel of Table 5 (above) in fact eliminate 
all of the publications and estimates Krueger identifies as being problematic (i.e., the nine publications 
with eight or more estimates) – although they are eliminated on grounds of statistical quality and not 
because they simply provided too many separate estimates of class size effects.  That panel also 
includes the Summers and Wolfe (1977) estimate, along with a number of other equally high quality 
analyses of student achievement.  But, most importantly, it also eliminates the 11 highly problematic 
estimates that come from estimates of the effect of teacher-pupil ratios using state level analyses that 
ignore differences in the state policy environment.  These latter estimates have a disproportionate 
impact on each of his tabulations even though they are arguably the poorest estimates of the effect of 
class size on student performance. 
  In sum, Krueger’s reanalysis of the econometric evidence achieves different results by 
emphasizing low-quality estimates. The low-quality estimates are demonstrably biased toward finding 
significant positive effects of class size reduction and of added spending.  His discussion tries to suggest 
that one is caught on the horns of a dilemma: either weight heavily the estimates from the nine 
                                                  
22 Note, to facilitate comparisons with Krueger (2000), this discussions includes the estimate of the effects of 
pupil-teacher ratios in Card and Krueger (1992b) that was excluded from the tabulations previously displayed; see 
footnote 14.  This one estimate in fact has a huge impact on the Krueger calculations because it comes from a 
frequently cited publication with a single estimate. 20 
 
 
    
publications with the most estimates (as in the overall estimates of Table 3) or weight heavily the low-
quality state aggregate estimates (as he favors).  In reality, another option is available: weight neither 
heavily because both suffer from serious statistical problems, as shown in the bottom of Table 5. 
  Remarkably, just re-weighted by the Krueger technique still provides weak support for the overall 
class size reduction policies that Krueger advocates. Most of the estimates, no matter how tabulated, 
are not statistically different from zero at conventional levels.  Thus, even when heavily weighting low-
quality estimates, he can only achieve his rhetorical purpose of emphasizing that “class size is 
systematically related to student performance” by giving equal weight to statistically insignificant and 
statistically significant results. 
 
2.1.2. Overall Econometric Specification   
  A key issue in considering the results of the educational production function analyses is whether 
they provide the necessary guidance for policy purposes.  Specifically, while they show a pattern of 
association, is it reasonable to infer that they identify causal relationships?    
  The issue is particularly important when put into the context of educational policy.  Resource 
allocations are determined by a complicated series of political and behavioral choices by schools and 
parents.  The character of these choices could influence the estimates of the effectiveness of resources.  
Consider, for example, the result of systematically assigning school resources in a compensatory 
manner.  If low achieving kids are given extra resources – say smaller classes, special remedial 
instruction, improved technology, and the like – there is an obvious identification problem.  Issues of 
this kind suggest both care in interpretation of results and the possible necessity of alternative 
approaches. 
  Before continuing, however, it is important to be more precise about the nature and potential 
importance of these considerations.  Funding responsibility for schools in the United States tends on 
average to be roughly equally divided between states and localities with the federal government 21 
 
 
    
contributing only 7 percent of overall spending.  Huge variation in funding levels and formulae 
nonetheless exists across states.  In most state funding of schools in the United States, the distribution 
of expenditure does not depend on the actual performance of individual students, but instead (inversely) 
on the wealth and income of the community.  In models of achievement that include the relevant family 
background terms (such as education, income, or wealth), this distribution of state resources would 
simply increase the correlations among the exogenous variables but would not suggest any obvious 
simultaneity problems for the achievement models.  In fact, while the compensatory nature of funding 
often motivates some concerns, even this correlation of background and resources is not clear.  Much 
of the funding debate in the United States has revolved around a concern that wealthier communities 
and parents can afford to spend more for schools, and in fact almost all state financing formula are 
designed to offset this tendency at least partially.  Thus, the actual correlations of resources and family 
backgrounds often are not very high.
23 
  At the individual student level, correlations with aggregate district resources through either 
formula allocations or community decisions are not a major cause of concern.  The individual 
classroom allocations may, however, be a concern.  For example, within a school, low achievers may 
be placed in smaller classes, suggesting the possibility of simultaneity bias.  Any such problems should 
be largely ameliorated by value-added models, which consider the student’s prior achievement directly.  
The only concern then becomes allocations made on the basis of unmeasured achievement influences 
that are unrelated to prior achievement. 
Particularly in the area of class size analysis, a variety of approaches do go further in 
attempting to identify causal effects, and the results are quite varied.  Hoxby (2000) used de-trended 
variations in the size of birth cohorts to identify exogenous changes in class size in small Connecticut 
                                                  
23 The distribution of state funds varies across the states, but one fairly common pattern is that major portions of 
state funds are distributed inversely to the property wealth of the community.  Because community wealth includes 
the value of commercial and industrial property within a community, the correlation of community wealth with 
the incomes of local residents tends to be low and sometimes even negative.   22 
 
 
    
towns. Changes in cohort sizes, coupled with the lumpiness of classes in small school districts, can 
provide variations in class size that are unrelated to other factors.
24 Other estimates have also explicitly 
considered exogenous factors affecting class size within the context of instrumental variables estimators 
for the effects of class size  (Akerhielm (1995); Boozer and Rouse (1995)).  Unfortunately, 
identification of truly exogenous determinants of class size, or resource allocations more generally, is 
sufficiently rare that other compromises in the data and modeling are frequently required. These 
coincidental compromises jeopardize the ability to obtain clean estimates of resource effects and may 
limit the generalizability of any findings.  Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2001), employing an approach 
similar in spirit to that used by Hoxby, make use of exogenous variations in class sizes within Texas 
schools across multiple cohorts of varying sizes.
25  The find some small class size effects, but the 
effects very significantly across grades and specifications. 
  These alternative approaches yield inconsistent results both in terms of class size effects and in 
terms of the effects of alternative methodologies.  The results in each of these analyses tend to be quite 
sensitive to estimation procedures and to model specification.  Further, they are inconsistent in terms of 
statistical significance, grade pattern, and magnitude of any effects.  As a group, the results are more 
likely to be statistically significant with the expected sign than those presented previously for all 
estimates, but the typical estimate (for statistically significant estimates) tends to be very small in 
magnitude (see below). 
2.2.  International Econometric Evidence 
  The evidence for countries other than the United States is potentially important for a variety of 
                                                  
24 While pertaining directly to the international evidence below, in a related approach Angrist and Lavy (1999) 
note that Maimonides’ Rule requires that Israeli classes cannot exceed forty students, so that, again, the lumpiness 
of classrooms may lead to large changes in class size when the numbers of students in a school approaches 
multiples of forty (and the preferred class size is greater than forty). They formulate a regression discontinuity 
approach to identify the effects of class size, but many of their estimates also use class size variation other than 
that generated by the discontinuities.  Similarly, Case and Deaton (1999) concentrate on the impact of white 
decision making on black schools in South Africa (where endogeneity from compensatory policies is arguably less 
important).  They conclude that smaller classes have an impact on student outcomes in that setting. 23 
 
 
    
reasons.  Other countries have varying institutional structures, so different findings could help to 
identify the importance of organization and overall incentives.  Moreover, other countries frequently 
have much different levels of resources and exhibit larger variance in resource usage, offering the 
prospect of understanding better the importance of pure resource differences.  For example, one 
explanation of the lack of relationship between resources and performance in the United States is its 
schools there are generally operating in an area of severe diminishing marginal productivity, placing 
most on the “flat of the curve.”  Thus, by observing schools at very different levels of resources, it 
would be possible to distinguish between technological aspects of the production relationship and other 
possible interpretations of the evidence such as imprecise incentives for students and teachers. 
While the international evidence has been more limited, this situation is likely to be reversed 
profitably in the future.  A key problem has been less available performance data for different 
countries, but this lack of information is being corrected.  As student outcome data become more 
plentiful – allowing investigation of value added by teachers in schools in different environments, 
international evidence can be expected to grow in importance. 
 
2.2.1  Developing Countries 
  Existing analyses in less developed countries have shown a similar inconsistency of estimated 
resource effects as that found in the United States.  While these estimates typically come from special 
purpose analyses and are frequently not published in refereed journals, they do provide insights into 
resource use at very different levels of support.  Table 6 provides evidence on resource effects from 
estimates completed by 1990.
26  Two facets of these data compared to the previous United States data 
stand out:  1.  In general, a minority of the available estimates suggests much confidence that the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
25 The nature of this analysis is discussed further below in the section on teacher quality. 
26 This compilation of results from Hanushek (1995) incorporates information from Fuller (1985), Harbison and 
Hanushek (1992), and a variety of studies during the 1980s.  
 
 
    
  Table 6.  Percentage Distribution of Estimated Expenditure Parameter Coefficients from 


















































































       
 
Source:  Hanushek (1995) 24 
 
 
    
identified resources positively influence student performance; and, 2.  There is generally somewhat 
stronger support for these resource policies than that existing in United States analyses.  Thus, the data 
hint that the importance of resources may vary with the level of resources, a natural presumption.  
Nonetheless, the evidence is not conclusive that pure resource policies can be expected to have a 
significant effect on student outcomes.   
2.2.2.  Developed Countries 
  The evidence on developed countries outside of the United States is more difficult to compile.  
The review by Vignoles et al. (2000) points to a small number of analyses outside of the U.S. and 
shows some variation them similar to that already reported among estimates elsewhere. The Forum 
article by Dustman et al. provides an additional set of estimates. 
One set of consistent estimates for the TIMSS data is presented in Hanushek and Luque 
(forthcoming).  They employ the data on variations in scores across schools within individual countries.  
The 17 countries with complete data for 9-year-olds and the 33 countries with complete data for 13-
year-olds are weighted toward more developed countries but do include poor countries.  As shown in 
Table 7, they find little evidence that any of the standard resource measures for schools are related to 
differences in mathematics scores within countries, although a majority of the class size results for the 
youngest age group do have the expected negative sign.  An extension of the estimation considers the 
possibility of compensatory allocation of students to varying class sizes.  Specifically, estimation for 
rural schools with a single classroom – where compensatory placement is not feasible – yields little 
change in the overall results.
27  The lack of significant resource effects when corrected for selection 
does differ from the findings of Angrist and Lavy (1999) and of Case and Deaton (1999), which find more 
significant resource effects in Israel and South Africa (see footnote 24 for details). 
                                                  
27 An additional check analyzes whether smaller classes in a given grade seem to be allocated on compensatory or 
elitist grounds and finds countries split on this.  The impact of such considerations on the estimated effects is 
nonetheless minimal.  
 
 
    
Table 7.  Distribution of estimated production function parameters across countries and age groups, by 
sign and statistical significance (10 percent level)   
Dependent variable: classroom average TIMSS mathematics score 
 
 
  Age 9 population  Age 13 population 
  Negative Positive  Negative Positive 
 Significant  Not 
significant 
Not 
significant  Significant 
Number 
of 
countries  Significant  Not 
significant 
Not 




Class Size  3  11 2  0  17  2  8 6 17  33 
Teacher with at 
least a bachelor’s 
degree 
0 3  12  0  15 2  11 12  2  32 
Teacher with 
special training  0 7 4 1  12 0  12 11  2  25 
Teacher experience  0  7  6  4  17 3  9 17  4  33 
 
 
Note:  Bold indicates the number of statistically significant results with the expected sign of the effect.  Because these estimates rely on actual class size, the 
expected sign is negative (and not reversed as for teacher-pupil ratios in the prior tables). 
 




    
Moreover, there is no evidence in this consistent work that there are different effects of 
resources by income level of the country or by level of the resources.  Thus, contrary to the 
conclusions of Heyneman and Loxley (1983), schools do not appear relatively more important for 
poorer countries. 
Woessman (2000, 2001) looks at cross national differences in TIMSS math and science scores 
and concludes that the institutional structure matters importantly for achievement.  By pooling the 
individual student test scores across countries and estimating models that include both school and 
national characteristics, he finds suggestive evidence that the amount of competition from private 
schools and the amount of decentralization of decision making to individuals schools have significant 
beneficial impacts, while union strength is detrimental and standard differences in resources across 
countries are not clearly related to student performance.  The limited number of national observations 
for institutions nevertheless leaves some uncertainty about the estimates and calls for replication in 
other samples that permit, say, variations within individual countries in the key institutional features. 
 
3.  Project STAR and experimental data
28  
  A different form of evidence – that from random assignment experiments – has recently been 
widely circulated in the debates about class size reduction.  In assessing resource effects, concern about 
selection remains, even in the instrumental approaches.  Following the example of medicine, one large 
scale experimental investigation in the State of Tennessee in the mid1980s (Project STAR) pursued the 
effectiveness of class size reductions.  Random-assignment experiments in principle have considerable 
appeal.  The underlying idea is that we can obtain valid evidence about the impact of a given well-
defined treatment by randomly assigning subjects to treatment and control groups, eliminating the 
possible contaminating effects of other factors and permitting conceptually cleaner analysis of the 
                                                  
28 For a more extensive discussion of Project STAR, see Hanushek (1999a, 1999b). 26 
 
 
    
outcomes of interest across these groups.  With observations derived from natural variations in 
individual selection, one must be able to distinguish between the treatment and other differences that 
might directly affect the observed outcomes and that might be related to whether or not they receive the 
treatment.  Randomization seeks to eliminate any relationship between selection into a treatment 
program and other factors that might affect outcomes.  (See, however, the caution provided in Todd 
and Wolpin (2002)). 
Project STAR was designed to begin with kindergarten students and to follow them for four 
years.  Three treatments were initially included: small classes (13-17 students); regular classes (22-25 
students); and regular classes (22-25 students) with a teacher’s aide.  Schools were solicited for 
participation, with the stipulation that any school participating must be large enough to have at least one 
class in each treatment group.  The initial sample included 6,324 kindergarten students.  These were 
split between 1,900 in small classes and 4,424 in regular classes.  (After the first year, the two separate 
regular class treatments were effectively combined, because there were no perceived differences in 
student performance).  The initial sample included 79 schools, although this subsequently fell to 75.  
The initial 326 teachers grew slightly to reflect the increased sample size in subsequent grades, although 
of course most teachers are new to the experiment at each new grade.  
  The results of the Project STAR experiment have been widely publicized.  The simplest 
summary is that: 1.  Students in small classes perform better than those in regular classes or regular 
classes with aides starting in kindergarten; 2.  The kindergarten performance advantage of small classes 
widens some in first grade but then either remains quantitatively the same (reading) or narrows (math) 
by third grade; and, 3.  Taking each grade separately, the difference in performance between small and 
regular classes is statistically significant.   
This summary reflects the typical reporting, focusing on the differences in performance at each 
grade and concluding that small classes are better than large (e.g., Finn and Achilles (1990); Mosteller 
(1995)).   But, it ignores the fact that one would expect the differences in performance to become wider 27 
 
 
    
through the grades because they continue to get more resources (smaller classes) and that should keep 
adding an advantage. This issue was first raised by Prais (1996), who framed the discussion in terms of 
the value-added.  As Krueger (1999) demonstrates, the small class advantage is almost exclusively 
obtained in the first year of being in a small class – suggesting that the advantages of small classes are 
not general across all grades.   
Moreover, this pattern of effects is at odds with the normal rhetoric about smaller classes 
permitting more individualized instruction, allowing improved class room interactions, cutting down on 
disruptions, and the like.  If these were the important changes, small classes should confer continuing 
benefits in any grades where they are employed.  Instead, the results appear more consistent with 
socialization or introduction into the behavior of the classroom – one time effects that imply more 
general class size reduction policies across different grades will not be effective. 
The actual gains in performance from the experimental reduction in class size were relatively 
small (less than .2 standard deviations of test performance), especially when the gains are compared to 
the magnitude of the class size reduction (around 8 students per class).  Thus, even if Project STAR is 
taken at face value, it has relatively limited policy implications. 
While the experimental approach has great appeal, the actual implementation in the case of 
Project STAR introduces uncertainty into these estimates (Hanushek (1999b)).  The uncertainty arises 
from questions about the quality of the randomization over time.  In each year of the experiment, there 
was sizable attrition from the prior year’s treatment groups, and these students were replaced with new 
students.  Of the initial experimental group starting in kindergarten, 48 percent remained in the 
experiment for the entire four years.  No information, such as pretest scores, is available to assess the 
quality of student randomization for the initial experimental sample or for the subsequent additions to it.  
Throughout the four years of the experiment there was substantial and nonrandom treatment group 
crossover (about 10 percent of the small class treatment group in grades 1-3).  There is also substantial, 
nonrandom test taking over the years of the experiment.  Most important, the results depend 28 
 
 
    
fundamentally on the choice of teachers.  While the teachers were to be randomly assigned to treatment 
groups, there is little description of how this was done.  Nor is it easy to provide any reliable analysis 
of the teacher assignment, because only a few descriptors of teachers are found in the data and because 
there is little reason to believe that they adequately measure differences in teacher quality.
29  The 
schools themselves were self-selected and are clearly not random.  Small schools were precluded from 
the study, and these were schools that were willing to provide their own partial funding to cover the full 
costs.  (This issue is also important, because the STAR experiment heavily oversampled urban and 
minority schools where the response to the program is thought to be largest).
30  The net result of each 
of these effects is difficult to ascertain, but there is prima facie evidence that the total impact is to 
overstate the impact of reduced class size (Hanushek (1999b)). 
  The importance of the methodology does deserve emphasis.  Because of questions about 
effectiveness and causality in the analysis of schools, further use of random assignment experimentation 
would have high value.  As Todd and Wolpin (this Forum) point out, random assignment experiments 
do not answer all of the policy questions.  Nonetheless, it would seem natural to develop a range of 
experiments that could begin to provide information about what kinds of generalizations can be made. 
4.  Interpreting the Resource Evidence 
  A wide range of analyses indicate that overall resource policies have not led to discernible 
improvements in student performance.  It is important to understand what is and is not implied by this 
conclusion.  First, it does not mean that money and resources never matter.  There clearly are situations 
where small classes or added resources have an impact.  It is just that no good description of when and 
where these situations occur is available, so that broad resource policies such as those legislated from 
                                                  
29 The teacher data include race, gender, teaching experience, highest degree, and position on the Tennessee 
career ladder.  While there is no information about the effect of career ladder position on student performance, as 
summarized above, none of the other measures have been found to be reliable indicators of quality.  For estimates 
of the magnitude of variation in teacher quality, see below. 
30 Krueger (1999) identifies significantly stronger effects for disadvantaged students, which will then be 
overweighted in calculating program average treatment effects.   29 
 
 
    
central governments may hit some good uses but also hit bad uses that generally lead to offsetting 
outcomes.  Second, this statement does not mean that money and resources cannot matter.  Instead, as 
described below, altered sets of incentives could dramatically improve the use of resources. 
  The evidence on resources is remarkably consistent across countries, both developed and 
developing.  Had there been distinctly different results for some subsets of countries, issues of what 
kinds of generalizations were possible would naturally arise.  Such conflicts do not appear particularly 
important. 
  There is a tendency by researchers and policy makers to take a single study and to generalize 
broadly from it.  By finding an analysis that suggests a significant relationship between a specific 
resource and student performance, they conclude that, while other resource usage might not be 
productive, the usage that is identified would be (e.g, Grissmer et al. (2000)).
31  It is just this tendency 
to overgeneralize from limited evidence that lies behind the search for multiple sources of evidence on 
the effectiveness of different resource usage.  That broader body of evidence provides little support for 
the input policies that continue to be the most common approach to decision making. 
5.  Teacher quality  
Starting with the Coleman Report on Equality of Educational Opportunity (Coleman et al. 
(1966)), many have argued that schools do not matter and that only families and peers affect 
performance.  Unfortunately, that report and subsequent interpretations of it have generally confused 
Ameasurability@ with true effects.  Specifically, as described above for more recent work, characteristics 
of schools and classrooms were not closely related to student performance B leading to the conclusion 
that schools do not matter.  This conclusion not only led to the extensive subsequent research but also 
                                                  
31 If this is so, it leads to a number of important questions.  Why is that schools have failed to employ such a 
policy?  Is it just that they don’t have the information that the researcher has?  That of course seems unlikely since 
schools in fact constantly experiment with a variety of approaches and resource patterns. Alternatively, consistent 
with the discussion below, it seems more likely that schools have limited incentives to seek out and to employ 
programs that consistently relate to student achievement. 30 
 
 
    
probably more than anything else to a prevailing view that differences among schools are not very 
important.   
The extensive research over the past 35 years has made it clear that there are very important 
differences among teachers and, by implication, schools.  This finding, of course, does not surprise 
many parents who are well aware of quality differences of teachers, but it eluded many researchers. 
  The simple definition of teacher quality used here is an output measure based on student 
performance, instead of the more typical input measures based on characteristics of the teacher and 
school.  High quality teachers are ones who consistently obtain higher than expected gains in student 
performance, while low quality teachers are ones who consistently obtain lower than expected gains.  
Using that definition, variations in teacher quality can be obtained by estimating fixed effects models of 
student performance after conditioning on entering student performance and other factors that affect 
achievement gains.  When this approach has been used in studying United States schools, large 
variations in performance have been uncovered (e.g., Hanushek (1971, 1992); Murnane (1975); 
Murnane and Phillips (1981); Armor et al. (1976); Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2001)).
32  The only 
related study internationally pertains to rural Brazil, where similarly large differences among teachers 
are found (Harbison and Hanushek (1992)). 
The magnitude of differences in teacher quality is impressive.  Looking at the range of quality 
for teachers within a single large urban district, teachers near the top of the quality distribution can get 
an entire year=s worth of additional learning out of their students compared to those near the bottom 
                                                  
32 In the general fixed effect formulation, identification and interpretation of teacher and school effects is 
nonetheless complicated.  For example, teacher effects, school effects and classroom peer effects are not 
separately identified if the estimates come from a single cross section of teachers.  Hanushek (1992), however, 
demonstrates the consistency of individual teacher effects across grades and school years, thus indicating that the 
estimated differences relate directly to teacher quality and not the specific mix of students and the interaction of 
teacher and students.  Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2001) remove separate school and grade fixed effects and 
observe the consistency of teacher effects across different cohorts – thus isolating the impact of teachers. 31 
 
 
    
(Hanushek (1992)).
33  That is, a good teacher will get a gain of 12 grade level equivalents while a bad 
teacher will get 2 year for a single academic year.   
A second set of estimates comes from recent work on students in Texas (Rivkin, Hanushek, and 
Kain (2001)).  The analysis follows several entire cohorts of students and permits multiple observations 
of different classes with a given teacher.  We look at just the variations in performance from 
differences in teacher quality within a typical school and do not consider any variations across schools, 
making them very much a lower bound on teacher effects.  The variation in teacher quality is large:  
Moving from an average teacher to one at the 85
th percentile of teacher quality (i.e., moving up one 
standard deviation in teacher quality) implies that the teacher=s students would move up more than 4 
percentile rankings in the given year.
34  These differences are huge compared to any of the estimates for 
measured teacher and school attributes.  For example, a one standard deviation reduction in class size 
implies a 0.01-.03 standard deviation improvement in student achievement. The lower bound estimate 
on teacher quality summarized implies a one standard deviation change in quality leads to a 0.11 
standard deviation increase in achievement. The fact that even the lower bound estimate of teacher 
quality effects dwarf either class size or experience effects should give policy makers pause. 
These estimates of teacher quality can also be related to the popular argument that family 
background is overwhelmingly important and that schools cannot be expected to make up for bad 
preparation from home.  The latter estimates of teacher performance suggest that having five years of 
good teachers in a row (one standard deviation above average, or at the 85
th quality percentile) would 
overcome the average achievement deficit between low income kids (those on free or reduced price 
                                                  
33 These estimates consider value-added models with family and parental models.  The sample includes only low 
income minority students, whose average achievement in primary school is below the national average.  The 
comparisons given compare teachers at the 5
th percentile with those at the 95
th percentile. 
34 For a variety of reasons, these are lower bounds estimates of variations in teacher quality.  Any variations in 
quality across schools would add to this.  Moreover, the estimates rely on a series of conservative assumptions 
which all tend to lead to understatement of the systematic teacher differences. 32 
 
 
    
lunch) and others from higher income families.  In other words, high quality teachers can make up for 
the typical deficits that we see in the preparation of kids from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
We do not tend to observe these deficits disappearing, however, because the current school 
system does not ensure any streaks of such high quality teachers – particularly for disadvantaged 
students.  In fact, it is currently as likely that the typical student gets a run of bad teachers -- with the 
symmetric achievement losses -- as a run of good teachers.   
6.  Policy alternatives  
  Much of economic analysis is built on a presumption that higher expenditure yields better 
outcomes.  Thus, many people are surprised to find evidence that school resources are not closely 
related to student performance.  Indeed, a variety of mechanisms might conceptually push schools 
toward better resource use.  Parents undoubtedly care about the performance of their children. 
Democratic political pressures might force responsive government actions.  And, household locational 
decisions allow families some latitude to select schools that are performing well.   
   But this is not a frictionless market with knowledgeable consumers making decisions with 
perfect information.  We are considering government provision of a service whose quality is difficult to 
judge.  Moving one’s residence or forcing better governmental performance in a specific service area is 
difficult and expensive.  Moreover, it is frequently difficult to separate the quality of the school from 
the quality of the students.  We know that parents as well as students exert a powerful influence on 
student achievement.  In order to make quality judgments, it is necessary to separate the school from 
the nonschool influences.  Parents can generally tell the differences among the different teachers within 
a given school, but comparing the average quality of teachers in one school to those in another is a 
more difficult task.  It is especially difficult because residential and school choice decisions frequently 
involve an element of sorting along socio-economic lines and, on average, along lines of student 
preparation.  Conventionally defined “good schools” are often schools with the best-prepared students 33 
 
 
    
going into them but not necessarily ones where the value-added of the school is particularly high and 
vice versa for “bad schools.” 
  The clearest contrast in policy perspectives is between input policy and output, or incentive, 
policies.  In the United States and elsewhere, for example, a very popular recent policy is funding or 
mandating smaller class sizes.  But, as the evidence indicates, this is an expensive and generally 
unproductive policy. 
In recognition of the importance of quality teachers, a variety of recommendations and policy 
initiatives have been introduced.  Unfortunately, the currently most popular proposals in the United 
States are likely to lower teacher quality rather than improve it.  The idea that has been picked up by 
United States policy makers at all levels is to increase the requirements to become a teacher.  The 
notion is simple: If we can insist on better prepared and more able teachers, teacher quality will 
necessarily rise, and student performance will respond.  This argument -- at least as implemented -- 
proves as incorrect as it is simple.  The range of options being pushed forward include raising the 
course work requirement for teacher certification, testing teachers on either general or specific 
knowledge, requiring specific kinds of undergraduate degrees, and requiring master=s degrees.  Each of 
these has surface plausibility, but little evidence exists to suggest that these are strongly related to 
teacher quality and to student achievement.   
More pernicious, these input requirements almost certainly act to reduce the supply of teachers.  
In other words, while the proposed requirements do little or nothing to ensure high quality teachers, 
they do cut down on the group of people who might enter teaching.  Teacher certification requirements 
are generally advertised as making sure that there is some minimum floor on quality, but, if the 
requirements end up keeping out high quality teachers who do not want to take the specific courses 
required, they instead act more like a ceiling on quality. 
  The alternative set of policies emphasizes performance incentives.  Few employees of U.S. 
public schools find that their jobs are at all dependent on the performance of students.  Pay, promotion, 34 
 
 
    
retention in a job, and the like appear to be little different for high quality teachers and low quality 
teachers.  Similarly jobs for school principals or other administrative and support personnel do not 
seem closely related to any student outcomes.  A simple idea that pervades economics is that incentives 
have powerful effects.  In the case of schools few incentives relate to the object of interest – student 
performance.  Thus, it should not be particularly surprising if added resources do not translate into 
better performance, because there is little feedback from performance. 
  Much of the larger debate about school policy actually revolves around proposed changes in the 
structure of school incentives.  The range of incentive policies currently under debate fall into three 
generic types.
35  First, merit pay for teachers – such as that recently introduced into British schools – or 
rewards to entire schools imply moving to a direct pay-for-performance relationship.  Second, 
privatization or contracting arrangements involve hiring private firms to provide given academic or 
nonacademic functions with their rewards based upon outcomes.  Finally, expanded choice of schools 
by students relies on the underlying idea that schools that do well will attract more students and those 
that do poorly will lose students and that this mechanism will provide incentives to improve student 
performance (Friedman (1962)).  (Choice actually comes in different forms identified chiefly by 
whether or not private schools can compete with public schools).   
  Each of these generic approaches has considerable appeal compared to the current system.  
Each focuses attention on what is desired, instead of trying to guess at a set of inputs that will lead to 
the desired result.  Contrary to the current structure, the general outline of each of the incentive 
structures makes economic sense. 
  Designing good incentives, however, is not easy.  For example, voucher opponents point to a 
variety of issues including the prospect of further racial and economic segregation in schools; the 
chance that schools offer undesirable courses of study; and the possibility that the competition does not 
                                                  
35 An expanded discussion of such incentives can be found in Hanushek and others (1994). 35 
 
 
    
have much impact on public schools.  Similarly, merit pay opponents argue that there is little research 
supporting positive outcomes (Cohen and Murnane (1986)); that its award is likely to be too subjective 
and political; and that individual rewards lead to undesirable competition among teachers.   
  In most cases, it would be possible to design incentive schemes that circumvent the largest 
problems, at least if the problems are anticipated.  Unfortunately, incentive contracts can be very 
complicated, and some of the reactions to the specified incentives might be surprising.  For example, an 
early experiment with performance contracting (that involved hiring private firms to teach basic 
subjects to disadvantaged students and paying the firms based on results) failed to yield much 
information because of fundamental flaws in the incentive contract (Gramlich and Koshel (1975)).
36  In 
other cases, such as the limited exploration of the use of vouchers in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a single 
highly constrained scheme was employed and even then considerable controversy over the outcomes 
continues (cf. Peterson, Greene, and Noyes (1996); Greene, Peterson, and Du (1998); Rouse (1998); 
Witte (1999)). 
37  
In sum, there is ample evidence that the currently employed input policies are failures. No one, 
of course, argues that they wish to pursue the failed policies of the past.  Typically, proponents of input 
policies either argue they have new ideas that not repeating the mistakes of the past policies.  However, 
these new policies, like those in the past, are seldom based on evidence of superiority.  An alternative 
form is to say that ‘money spent wisely will yield favorable outcomes,’ but this is tautological. 
 At the same time the generic incentive approaches, with the exception of certain specific kinds 
of merit pay schemes, have not been tried very often, so there is little experience with developing good 
contracts.  Moreover, no systematic approach to developing information about incentives has been 
                                                  
36 The experimental contract did not offer firms a fair chance to make a profit, provided no payment to the firms 
if achievement gains were below the national average, and capped the maximum reward.  These provisions 
provided poor incentives and led firms to do a variety of educationally inappropriate things. 
37 Assessment controversies have arisen over the length of time before achievement gains should be expected, 
over the appropriate comparison groups, and over the costs of private schooling. 36 
 
 
    
employed.  Therefore, the superiority of using performance incentives instead of relying on just input 
policies remains largely untapped. 
A significant issue in the discussion of incentives is the slowness with which evidence 
accumulates.  There is not a strong scientific evaluation tradition within education.  Further, because 
education is such a potent political issue, there are constant pressures to go immediately to new 
universal policies without worrying too much about the evidence supporting them.  This has two 
features.  First, many mistakes are made (leading to the results described previously).  Second, no new 
evidence accumulates to aid in making future decisions.   
The State of California provides an informative if discouraging case study.  In 1997, the State 
provided financial incentives to school districts to reduce class size.  This politically popular program, 
offered to all districts simultaneously, defies any evaluation because no baseline performance data are 
available and because all districts received the same treatment.  It continues with appropriations of $1.5 
billion annually with no information about its effectiveness. 
If educational policies are to be improved, much more serious attention must be given to 
developing solid evidence about what things work and what things do not.  Developing such evidence 
means that regular high quality information about student outcomes must be generated.  In particular, it 
must be possible to infer the value-added of schools.  Improvement also would be advanced 
significantly by the introduction and general use of random assignment experiments and other well-
defined evaluation methods.  Without incentives and without adequate evaluation, there should be no 
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